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THE LAWLESS ADJUDICATOR 
Robin West" 
I would like to thank the Cardozo School of Law for hosting this 
lovely event honoring the work of Richard Weisberg, and particularly 
his text, The Failure of the Word. 1 I am honored and quite touched and 
humbled by the invitation to address this distinguished group of 
scholars. To speak personally for a moment, The Failure of the Word 
opened many doors for me. It showed me a sort of writing and 
scholarship about law and justice and the great questions of 
jurisprudence that I did not know existed: the scholarly attempt, that is, 
to find in canonical works of literature philosophical insights about the 
meaning of law and the promise of justice.2 It also suggested, obliquely 
at the time, a way of responding to deconstructive challenges to the 
coherence of law, to the justice of Codes, and to legalistic virtues, 
without resorting to a sort of soul-sucking authoritarianism.3 Finally, 
and most specifically, it built a literary and legal case for the homicidal 
criminality of an adjudicator, Captain Vere, who for the most personal 
and perverted reasons betrays rather than upholds a legal text, and does 
so toward the end of murdering-through a purportedly legal 
execution-an innocent man.4 All of these projects-the call to return 
to the literary text, the defense of legalism (or as Weisberg forthrightly 
puts it in his paper, his "reverence for law"5), and lastly the "Bill of 
Particulars" he brings against Vere, the lawless adjudicator-went 
deeply against the grain of two thousand plus years of Western thought, 
and certainly the modem and postmodern legal academy. I will 
comment in detail only on the last of these contributions: the 
characterization of Vere as a lawless adjudicator. Then I will say 
• Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
I RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN 
MODERN FICTION (1984) [hereinafter FAILURE OF THE WORD]' . 
2 Failure of the Word does this by example. Weisberg later argued directly for a return to 
the literature in RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE (1992). 
3 Again, Failure of the Word does so by example; Weisberg later argues for this directly, in 
his important historical work on Vichy France. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND 
THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE (1996) [hereinafter VICHY LAW]. 
4 FAILURE OF THE WORD, supra note 1, at 147-70. 
5 Richard H. Weisberg, 20 Years (or 2000?) of Story-Telling on the Law: Is Justice 
Detectable?, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2223, 2225 (2005). 
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something very quickly about Weisberg's reverence for legalism and 
justice, argued for indirectly in The Failure of the Word, and much 
more explicitly here.6 
First, on the "lawless adjudicator." The question I want to pose is 
this: Why is it so hard for the legal academy-and the legal 
profession-to come to grips with the bare logic of the charge, much 
less the case, that Vere acted lawlessly, and therefore criminally, and 
indeed murderously, when he willfully distorted the governing law, so 
as to execute Billy? Why has this quite specific legal claim not received 
more of a hearing? Is it because Weisberg was not sufficiently 
considerate in his communication of this idea? On first blush that 
seems implausible: It is one thing, after all, to argue syllogistically that 
Claggart is Christ, that Claggart is a villain, and that therefore Christ is a 
villain-one can see why that claim may require considerate 
communication7-but the indictment of the fictional Vere in a 
nineteenth century novella? Why has it proven so hard for the academy 
to hear Weisberg's claim that Vere is a murderer? Here is the 
syllogism: Vere was charged with the duty to uphold the law, he 
betrayed the law and his duty to apply it in order to execute an innocent 
man, and he did it knowingly, intentionally, and with plenty of malice 
aforethought, and for the most profoundly personal, political reasons. 
Therefore, Vere is a lawless adjudicator, a dissembler, a criminal, a 
murderer. Does that straightforward legal argument-that an 
adjudicator is a man to whom the power to declare what the law is has 
been delegated; that an adjudicator might be a criminal, and might 
achieve criminal ends, through dissembling, misrepresenting, or 
perverting legal texts, and thereby through breaching a trust-itself 
require considerate communication? Has our faith in adjudication 
reached such absurd heights that the lawless or criminal adjudicator has 
become an unthinkable oxymoron? Or, have our expectations dropped 
so low that the phrase "lawless adjudicator" has become redundant, so 
self evident, that the presentation, the claim, that an adjudicator is 
lawless, is just a trite, banal, and unnecessary restatement of a mode of 
being always and already present in courts of law? 
Briefly, I think, the answer is "yes" to both these questions. The 
assertion that an adjudicative claim is both false and politically 
motivated is inevitably met these days, in the legal academy, first, with 
a two-fold shrug: the first shrug, "Oh, who's to say what's 'false' 
anyway," and the second shrug, "Political? So what?-of course it is, 
are not they all, are not we all, how could it possibly be otherwise?" 
That double-shrug is then followed with a statement of alarm, or at least 
6 ld. 
7 ld. at 2225. 
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consternation, that betrays perhaps a too-fond identification with the 
bench: "Surely, an adjudicator can't be lawless simply for putting 
forward even a bad legal argument." So, what happens against such 
background presuppositions in the legal academy-a background that 
combines the deepest imaginable faith in adjudicative wisdom with the 
broadest conceivable denial of the possibility of fidelity to law-to the 
Weisbergian claim that an adjudicator is lawless? What follows, I 
think, is that, except for in Richard Weisberg's scholarship, Captain 
Vere and all of his lawless co-conspirators on the bench get off scot-
free. 
But again, how did we get to this state of affairs? Why are lawyers 
and legal academics so oddly inattentive to the problem of the lawless 
adjudicator? Weisberg suggests an answer in this paper. Vere's 
defenders, he suggests in an aside, have always tended to be dogmatic 
authoritarians, citing as an example Richard Posner's near hysterical 
defense of Vere' s honor against Weisberg's challenge.8 Well, that may 
be a fair characterization of Posner-I have certainly argued as much9-
but as influential as the good judge may be, he was, is, and will always 
be an exceptional case. He is not representative, at least of the legal 
academic trend I am trying to describe. It is just not true that the 
legions of legal academics and lawyers-largely left-leaning democratic 
contributors to John Kerry's campaign-who have a hard time even 
hearing, much less evaluating, Weisberg's depiction of Vere as a 
lawless adjudicator, are "dogmatic authoritarians." Quite the contrary: 
many of these people consider themselves to be, and in most respects 
are, a thorn in the side of the status quo, critical thinkers in all respects, 
inquisitive, challenging, non-dogmatic, skeptical, anti-authoritarians. 
So, "dogmatic authoritarianism" does not cut it. Somehow these non-
dogmatic, critical, anti-authoritarians are blinded by their faith in 
adjudication, or their skepticism regarding law, or, oddly, both to the 
criminality and villainy of the lawless adjudicator. How did we get to 
this point? 
Let me broaden the question, quickly, and then suggest an answer. 
First, to broaden it: Richard Weisberg is not the only legal critic of the 
last three, four or five decades to suggest the criminality of lawless 
adjudicators. Two examples of recent vintage come to mind, and three 
if we go back further, as we ultimately must, back to 1954, to 
understand this piece of our current intellectual milieu. But let us start 
with the more recent. In an early 1990s capital murder case, \0 the 
8 Id. at 2226-27. 
9 Robin West, Law, Literature, and the Celebration of Authority, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 977 
(1989). 
10 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
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Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state's decision to 
execute a defendant in spite of the production, post-verdict, of credible 
evidence strongly suggestive of the defendant's innocence. Well, said 
the Court, whether or not too little, definitely too late: the evidence 
pointing to innocence is not timely, and to consider it would be too 
burdensome for the state; the execution must go forward. Justice 
Blackmun, in dissent, complained that the state's action, and the Court's 
affinnance of it, comes "perilously close" to simple murder. 11 
That extraordinary remark, I believe, suggests two questions of 
relevance here: First, why "perilously close"? We are putting an 
innocent man to death, with malice aforethought .... But second, is 
Blackmun suggesting that the Justices that did this are "perilously 
close" to being murderers? Does a Supreme Court Justice really think 
this of his brethren? If so, shouldn't we all be upset? Or, was he 
speaking metaphorically, or maybe only speaking of the state 
executioners, and surely not of his brethren on the Court. "Considerate 
communication," indeed. 
My second example is of even more recent vintage, and comes 
from an article written by Vincent Bugliosi, an ex-California State's 
Attorney, and published by The Nation l2 in the wake of Bush v. Gore. 13 
Bugliosi, speaking directly to the scores of constitutional lawyers who 
had pronounced the Court's decision in that case to be political and 
legally untenable, had this to say: 
If, indeed, the Court, as the critics say, made a politically motivated 
ruling (which it unquestionably did), this is tantamount to saying, 
and can only mean, that the Court did not base its ruling on the law. 
And if this is so (which again, it unquestionably is), this means that 
these five Justices deliberately and knowingly decided to nullify the 
votes of the fifty million Americans who voted for Al Gore and to 
steal the election for Bush. Of course, nothing could possibly be 
more serious in its enormous ramifications. The stark reality, and I 
say this with every fiber of my being, is that the institution 
Americans trust the most to protect its freedoms and principles 
committed one of the biggest and most serious crimes this nation has 
ever seen-pure and simple, the theft of the presidency. And by 
definition, the perpetrators of this crime have to be denominated 
criminals. 
Since the notion of five Supreme Court Justices being criminals is 
so alien to our sensibilities and previously held beliefs ... most 
readers will find my characterization of these Justices to be 
intellectually incongruous. But make no mistake about it, I think my 
II Id. at 446. 
12 Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call it Treason, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at II. 
13 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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background in the criminal law is sufficient to inform you that 
Scalia, Thomas et al. are criminals in the very truest sense of the 
word. 14 
2257 
Bugliosi's article was titled None Dare Call It Treason. Indeed 
they do not-but why do they not? Paraphrasing Weisberg: Why the 
considerate communication? I will get to my third example in a 
moment, but first, let me answer the Bugliosi-Weisberg question. Why 
don't they call it treason? Why do we not call them murderers, when 
they dissemble and pervert the law for personal and political reasons in 
order to legitimate and abet the execution of the innocent; why do we 
not call it treason, or at least theft, when they successfully conspire to 
steal an election? To get back to fiction: why can we not at least judge 
Vere, a fictional adjudicator, and find him guilty? And what good is 
law, anyway, or the Rule of Law, if we cannot? 
Is it a failure of nerve, a proneness to dizziness? Well, yes, 
probably. I do not know anyone in law schools, or anyone period, other 
than Vincent Bugliosi (who was, perhaps, toughened up by prosecuting 
Charles Manson and his gang thirty years ago) who wants to bring 
down on their corporeal being or on their precious institutions the holy 
wrath of the organized legal political right. 
But there are two more local, more cerebral, less character-based 
reasons as well. The first, although the most germane, perhaps, to these 
proceedings, I will only mention because I have written on it at length 
elsewhere,15 and that is the indeterminacy thesis and its grip on the 
modem and postmodem legal imagination. One simply cannot assert 
the lawlessness or the criminality of an adjudicator, of all people, if one 
simultaneously holds some version of the claim that statements 
purporting to say "what the law is" cannot possibly be true or false, 
because of the thorough-going radical indeterminacy of legal texts. 
There is no actus reus for the larceny, in other words, even if there is 
intent: there is no taking, no theft, no treason, in terms of the indictment 
Bugliosi wants to bring. There are only arguments, good or bad, 
congenial or not. There are no claims of law that could be faithful or 
duplicitous. There is no possibility of fidelity to law, if there is no law 
sufficiently determinate to command fidelity. If we cannot claim 
fidelity, we can hardly claim infidelity, duplicity, disingenuity, 
perversion, or distortion of law. Without that major premise, of course, 
14 Bugliosi, supra note 12, at 11. 
15 See, e.g., Robin L. West, Are There Nothing But Texts in This Class? interpreting the 
interpretive Turns in Legal Thought, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1125 (2000); ROBIN L. WEST, RE-
IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (2003); Robin L. West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119 (2003). 
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Bugliosi's indictment of the Rehnquist Court falls apart, as does 
Blackmun's charge, as does, of course, Weisberg's indictment of Vere. 
But this is only half of the story. The broad based denial of the 
possibility of fidelity or infidelity to law, I think, is clearly but only 
partly attributable to the grip of the indeterminacy thesis on the 
contemporary legal imagination. The other variable in my equation, A 
+ B = C, where C equals the pass we give the lawless adjudicator and B 
is the indeterminacy thesis, is faith-and specifically, faith in legal, 
adjudicative wisdom, even when, particularly when, adjudication 
departs from fidelity. What accounts for this extraordinary faith-a 
faith held, clearly, by both those who do and do not hold some version 
of the indeterminacy thesis? 
There may have been some version of this faith always with us, but 
its current form dates, I believe, to Brown v. Board of Education. 16 
Brown did two things that matter to Weisberg's eventual thesis. First, it 
did what justice required: it declared segregation unconstitutional. 
Second, it did so anti-legalistically, at least if we assume Weisberg's 
understanding of legalism as in some way a matter of interpreting 
binding legal texts in a way that holds true to authorial intent. Brown 
did not quite say that "history is bunk," but it came awfully close: the 
Court basically proclaimed itself not bound by its own history.17 The 
Brown Court rested its conclusion, not on the authority of the past, or on 
the authority of the text of the Constitution; but rather, on the pressing 
necessity of eradicating a present harm and a present injustice. The 
appeal in Brown was to principle and consequence-not the past, not 
the text, and not the law. Both prongs of Brown-the doing of justice 
and the Court's willful decision to limit its own attentiveness to the past, 
and hence, arguably, to law-were central to Brown's legacy: a legacy 
that unquestionably includes a revolution, a total transformation, in our 
understanding of what justice minimally requires in our social relations 
with each other, but also, a transformed generation of liberal, visionary 
legal scholars, all of whom were and are committed, to varying degrees 
of explicitness and inconsiderateness, to the proposition that justice can 
and must be done by courts, through legal institutions and forms, 
whether by using, or ignoring, the law itself. Courts, meaning judges, 
[d. 
16 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17 See id. at 492-93. 
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the 
Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We 
must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place 
in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if 
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the 
laws. 
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meaning adjudicators, morally must do justice, even in the face of 
Codes-legal Codes-that seemingly command the contrary. Given 
law's indeterminacy, furthermore, the "must" in that sentence all the 
more readily implies the "can": the Constitutional phrases guide, but 
never command, the wise adjudicator toward a justice, which is 
nevertheless unconstrained by law. Thus the aspiration of a liberal 
generation of lawyers: Justice can be achieved through wise 
adjudication, even in the face of hostile, but thankfully, given 
indeterminacy, not binding law. 
Brown, then, prompted the third of my three examples of 
allegations of lawless adjudication: recall the "Impeach Earl Warren" 
signs that sprouted up along highways in southern states in the 
aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education. Earl Warren: the lawless 
adjudicator. So, in addition to the powerful intellectual and moral 
currents drowning out the allegation of a lawless adjudicator quickly 
described above, add this potent cultural determinant: liberal legalists of 
the past half century do not wan.t to cast their lot with the southern 
segregationist movement's attempt to impeach Earl Warren. To 
convince us, ultimately, of the criminality of Vere, I would infer from 
all of this that Richard Weisberg must not only demonstrate that law 
possesses some degree of determinacy, and must somehow cast some 
doubt on the liberal legalist's faith in the unconstrained pursuit of 
justice through adjudicative institutions, but must also, somehow, 
rewrite Brown, so as to bring its self-evidently morally mandatory result 
in alignment with Weisberg's own self-evident reverence for law. The 
assumption of the last fifty years has been that the justice upheld in 
Brown was at odds with the law Weisberg reveres. To rehabilitate law, 
then, one must re-write that decision. 
Now, a word about the second promise of The Failure of the Word. 
In that book indirectly, but in his paper more explicitly, Weisberg puts 
forward not only the basis for his indictment of the lawless adjudicator, 
but also the basis for his moral embrace of the law Vere eschews. 
Weisberg's essay is a moral, political, and intellectual brief for 
legalism: for the virtue of fidelity to law, for the goodness of legal 
Codes, and the need for individuals and societies to choose their 
governing texts wisely and on the basis of sound foundational values. I 
found the moral convictions expressed here-the reverence for 
legalism, the respect for Codes, and the focus on the Codifier, rather 
than the adjudicator, as the lawgiver-to be a welcome and stark 
contrast to the reverence for discursive, long-winded, principled 
adjudication, on the one hand, and the present and future-oriented 
consequentialism so central to the new legal pragmatism, on the other, 
that now surrounds me in the legal academy. But we need to tread 
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carefully. Much harm, spiritual and otherwise, much injustice, can be 
done, is done, and has been done, through undue, unwarranted, 
undeserved fidelity to legal texts that may themselves be cruel, riddled 
through with ressentiment, abortive of human freedoms, aspirations, and 
pleasures, and of course, horribly unjust for the manifest inequality they 
express and perpetuate. Then what for legalism? 
To take a relatively limited example: even a judge's stance, but 
certainly a citizen's stance, toward a criminal code that still criminalizes 
crack cocaine at 100 times the degree of severity as powder cocaine, 
should perhaps be something less than reverential toward the 
legalisms-codified and otherwise-that present him with this 
dilemma; likewise, the Slave Codes, the Jim Crow Laws, the Fugitive 
Slave Acts, the Apartheid Laws, the Race Laws, and so on and so on 
and so on . .. Richard of course knows this: that is why he directs our 
attention to the values expressed in foundational law, as well as the 
badly neglected virtues of legalistic fidelity.18 But that identification of 
foundational values as that which in tum justifies legalist fidelity cries 
out for elaboration and elucidation. What are they? They must, 
presumably, be something other than the value of legalistic justice itself. 
In this day of empire, of nation-building, of transitional administrative 
law, of interim constitutions, and so on and so on and so on, such 
questions are not fanciful. Legal justice may be-I think it is-in part 
about fidelity to a deservedly well-regarded legal text by mature 
individuals who have chosen their texts wisely. But it is not only that. 
It is also a matter of legal creation in accord with values felt deeply. 
But lastly, it is also a matter of knowing when, and at what cost, to 
sever the ties to the past, to absorb the cost of being set adrift, when 
those foundational texts and the values that inform them prove lethal, or 
inhuman, or at odds with the blessed community, or the "human 
personality," to borrow a phrase from Martin Luther King's Letter from 
a Birmingham Jail; 19 when a legal Code proves itself to be not a law for 
free and productive individuals, but a recipe for disaster. I am quite 
sure, absurdly confident, that Richard Weisberg, who has so powerfully 
reminded us of the forgotten legalist virtues, will prove equally 
illuminating when he shines his light of reason on those codified legal 
perversions; perversions that evidence not only the ressentiment of the 
Captain Veres among us, but of the legal Codes themselves, and will 
help us see when our deepest commitments, legalist and humanist both, 
18 See Weisberg, supra note 5; VICHY LAW, supra note 3, at 486-529; FAILURE OF THE 
WORD, supra note 1, at 114-29. 
19 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail, reprinted in MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 76 (1964). 
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counsel not a robust lawfulness, but the need for either measured, or 
inconsiderate, civil disobedience. 
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